General

When U.S. President Donald Trump departed Beijing after two days of meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the visit was framed by both governments as an effort to stabilise one of the world’s most consequential relationships. Trade, Taiwan, Iran, investment access and broader strategic competition dominated the agenda. Trump described the talks positively and suggested that significant economic progress had been made. Within a day of Trump’s departure, multiple outlets reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin was expected to visit Beijing the following week for meetings with Xi Jinping, with some reports pointing to May 20 as the likely date. The sequence immediately attracted international attention. Not because it necessarily signalled a new China-Russia alliance or a dramatic American diplomatic defeat, but because it illustrated something more important about the current international system: Beijing increasingly occupies a position that both Washington and Moscow consider strategically important. For students of international relations like myself, the symbolism matters almost as much as the policy outcomes themselves. China hosted the president of the United States, its principal strategic competitor, and then prepared to receive the president of Russia, one of Beijing’s most important strategic partners, within the same diplomatic window. That kind of sequencing reinforces Beijing’s growing role as a central convening power in an increasingly fragmented international order. The significance of the moment lies not in claims that China has “replaced” the United States as the world’s dominant power. Such conclusions would be premature. The United States still retains unmatched military alliances, global financial influence, technological advantages and institutional reach. Rather, the significance lies in how China is positioning itself within a system in which major powers increasingly need to engage Beijing, even as they distrust aspects of its rise. Trump’s visit itself reflected the complexity of the current U.S.-China relationship. According to reports from UPI, ABC News and other outlets, discussions covered trade disputes, Taiwan, Iran, artificial intelligence and broader geopolitical competition. Trump publicly characterised the summit as productive and referred to potential ‘fantastic’ trade arrangements, although Chinese and American officials initially released relatively limited details on finalised agreements. Chinese officials adopted a more restrained tone, according to the Wall Street Journal. Beijing later confirmed the establishment of new trade and investment dialogue mechanisms, but did not publicly present the summit as producing a sweeping breakthrough. That contrast in messaging was notable. Washington emphasised momentum and dealmaking; Beijing emphasised continuity and controlled engagement. This difference reflects deeper strategic realities. The United States approaches China from a position shaped by rivalry, economic interdependence and growing security competition. Washington seeks cooperation where possible, particularly on trade stability, supply chains and regional crises, while simultaneously attempting to constrain Chinese influence in advanced technology, military expansion and regional dominance. China, by contrast, appears focused on managing tensions with the United States without appearing dependent on American approval or vulnerable to American pressure. Beijing’s objective is not necessarily reconciliation. Rather, many argue that Beijing seeks a more stable relationship with Washington while preserving freedom of action in areas it considers core national interests. Taiwan remained one of the clearest illustrations of this dynamic during the summit. Chinese officials reportedly warned against what they see as American interference in what Beijing considers an internal matter. U.S. officials, meanwhile, continued to frame Taiwan as central to regional security and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Neither side fundamentally altered its position. That is important because modern summit diplomacy between great powers often produces less in the form of transformative agreements and more in the form of strategic signalling. Meetings themselves become demonstrations of access, influence and diplomatic management rather than vehicles for comprehensive settlement. Seen in that context, Putin’s expected visit to Beijing takes on additional significance. Whereas Trump’s trip represented engagement between strategic competitors, Putin’s visit reflects an already established partnership that has deepened considerably since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. China and Russia are not formal military allies in the traditional sense, but their relationship has expanded across trade, energy, finance, diplomacy and strategic coordination. The economic dimension is particularly important. China has emerged as Russia’s largest trading partner since the invasion of Ukraine, according to trade analysis and research institutions tracking post-2022 economic flows. Following Western sanctions and Europe’s reduction of Russian energy imports, Moscow redirected substantial portions of its trade toward Asian markets, especially China. Bilateral trade has risen sharply over the past several years compared with pre-war levels. At the same time, both governments have accelerated efforts to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar in bilateral transactions. Russian and Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that most bilateral trade between the two countries is now conducted in Rouble and Yuan rather than Dollars, reflecting a broader push to reduce dependence on Western financial systems. Independent verification of exact percentages varies, but the broader trend toward de-dollarisation in bilateral trade is well documented. Energy has become one of the strongest pillars of this relationship. China remains among the largest buyers of Russian fossil fuels, providing Moscow with a critical export market after European demand declined sharply following the invasion of Ukraine. For Russia, Chinese demand has helped cushion the economic impact of sanctions. For China, discounted Russian energy provides long-term supply security at a time of increasing geopolitical uncertainty. The relationship also carries strategic implications beyond economics. Western officials and investigative reporting have alleged that Chinese companies and intermediaries supplied components with potential military applications to Russian industries during the Ukraine war, allegations Beijing has denied. Reuters reported in 2025 that Chinese-made engines were allegedly routed through intermediary firms and mislabelled before reaching Russian drone manufacturers. Beijing has denied providing lethal military assistance to Moscow and insists that it maintains a neutral position regarding the conflict. Regardless of disputed details surrounding individual cases, China has continued to maintain close political and economic ties with Russia despite sustained Western pressure to reduce that cooperation. That balancing act is central to Beijing’s foreign policy strategy. China does not appear to want Russia to collapse economically or become

We’re hiring. Not incrementally, and certainly not slowly, but at a pace that forces uncomfortable questions about scale, capability, and judgment. Across the Maxwell Investments Group (MIG) ecosystem, we have expanded into multiple sectors simultaneously. Some sectors are adjacent, while others are known to us but can also qualify as entirely unfamiliar. This is not simply a strategy problem. It is, at its core, a people problem. Because companies do not scale. People do.   And right now, we need over 100 executives, individuals capable of managing complexity, as well as navigating ambiguity, constructing new systems, and making high-stakes decisions in environments where the rules are still being written. This is Ghana, after all. Yet in the process of hiring for this next phase, an unexpected constraint has emerged: the traditional markers of intelligence, the very signals we have relied on for decades, no longer reliably predict who will succeed at MIG. The Signal Collapse of “Looking Smart” At first glance, the modern talent pool appears extraordinarily strong. Candidates are more credentialed, more articulate, and more professionally curated than at any point in history. Degrees, certifications, side projects, and personal brands have become baseline expectations rather than differentiators. In economic terms, what we are witnessing is a drastic signal inflation. When everyone appears intelligent, the appearance itself loses informational value. The sociologist Randall Collins described this phenomenon in his work on credential inflation. He postulates that as more individuals acquire traditional markers of competence, those markers cease to function as meaningful filters. Hiring, paradoxically, becomes harder, not easier, because the signals we rely on have become noisy. When observation precedes theory This realisation did not begin with academic literature. It began with an internal contradiction I have been forced to endure. Within our own organisation, some of the most valuable individuals do not possess elite academic pedigrees. By conventional standards, they were not the “strongest” candidates on paper. Yet they demonstrate a pattern of behaviour that is difficult to ignore. They learn faster, adapt more fluidly, anticipate problems earlier, and navigate interpersonal dynamics with unusual precision. Over time, they have become indispensable. Conversely, candidates with near-perfect academic records have often struggled in environments characterised by ambiguity and rapid change, like at MIG. They are highly effective in structured contexts, but less so when confronted with incomplete information, shifting priorities, and real-world trade-offs. This divergence aligns with decades of research in organisational psychology. While cognitive ability remains a strong predictor of performance in stable, well-defined roles, its predictive power declines significantly in complex, dynamic environments. Addressing this gap, psychologist Robert Sternberg’s theory of successful intelligence defines intelligence as the ability to achieve one’s personal goals in life, within one’s sociocultural context, rather than just achieving high scores on traditional IQ tests. He argues that traditional systems favour analytical skills, even though real-world success requires a broader mix of abilities. What the data now confirms What was once subjective is now empirically supported. Google’s Project Oxygen and subsequent internal research found that traditional indicators such as GPA and test scores had limited predictive value for job performance, particularly in leadership roles. Instead, qualities such as learning ability, humility, and collaboration emerged as stronger predictors. Similarly, the World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs reports consistently rank skills like analytical thinking, creativity, resilience, and flexibility above purely technical competencies. The implication is both subtle and profound, and it hits me right in the face. We have been selecting proxies for intelligence rather than intelligence itself. I’d like to change that. Technology and the repricing of intelligence If signal inflation was the first disruption, technology is the second, and far more consequential. We all see how artificial intelligence has enhanced productivity but it has also fundamentally altered what it means to be “smart.” Tasks once considered hallmarks of intelligence, such as coding, data analysis and research synthesis, are increasingly automated or augmented by machines. This raises an uncomfortable question: if a machine can outperform a human at these tasks, were they ever true indicators of intelligence, or simply manifestations of trained pattern recognition? In economic terms, technical intelligence is being commoditised. And as with any commodity, its abundance reduces its marginal value. Diamonds wouldn’t be diamonds if everyone had a kilo in their cupboard. This helps explain a phenomenon that might otherwise appear weird. Recently, there have been widespread layoffs of highly educated, highly skilled professionals. These individuals have not become less capable; rather, the relative value of their capabilities has shifted. From intelligence to judgment If traditional intelligence is no longer a sufficient differentiator, what replaces it? The answer, increasingly, is judgment. Judgment is the ability to operate effectively under conditions of uncertainty. It is not reducible to knowledge or technical skill. Rather, it emerges from the integration of multiple capacities: pattern recognition, contextual awareness, emotional intelligence, and the ability to make decisions without complete information. This aligns with the work of Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein who studied decision-making under uncertainty. While Kahneman emphasised cognitive biases, Klein’s research on firefighters and military leaders highlighted the role of recognition-primed decision-making, which is often colloquially described as intuition. What we dismiss as “gut feeling” is frequently the product of compressed experience comprising of rapid, subconscious pattern matching built over time. The Measurement Problem So therein lies my operational challenge in all the above-stated. The traits that matter most, like judgment, adaptability, curiosity, resilience, are precisely the ones that are hardest to measure. As a result, we have had to (and even still) default to what is legible: CVs, degrees, years of experience, and structured interviews. But legibility is not the same as accuracy. Interviews in particular have become increasingly performative. I personally don’t even do them anymore. Candidates prepare extensively, mastering behavioural frameworks and rehearsing narratives designed to signal competence. The result is not necessarily a more accurate assessment of capability, but a more polished simulation of it. In many cases, we select those who are best at “appearing” intelligent within controlled environments. The structural

In Ghana today, a quiet but important economic shift is taking place. After a period of intense price increases, inflation has been declining.  According to available data, Ghana’s annual inflation averaged about 39-40% in 2023 and fell to roughly 20-23% in 2024. It continues to fall. On paper, this is a significant improvement. Policymakers, economists, and international partners often interpret this trend as a sign that the economy is stabilising after years of turbulence driven by currency depreciation, global shocks, and domestic fiscal pressures. Yet across markets, trotro stations, campuses and offices in Accra and beyond, the reaction is very different.  “Rice is more expensive than last year.” “Transport fares haven’t come down.” “Everything still feels costly.” So what really happened? What explains this disconnect? The answer lies in a simple but often misunderstood truth that lower inflation does not mean lower prices. What inflation really measures. Inflation measures how fast prices are increasing, not whether they are high or low.  It is calculated as the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which tracks the cost of a basket of goods and services such as food, transport, housing, and utilities. When inflation is high, prices are rising quickly. When inflation falls, prices are still rising, but more slowly. This distinction is important. For example, JoyNews reported that Ghana’s inflation rate averaged 40.27% in 2023, the highest in over two decades.  Even though inflation dropped in 2024, it remained above 20%, meaning prices continued to rise significantly, just not as rapidly as before. Rice Prices as A Real Ghanaian Example. Consider a common household staple like imported rice. Many consumers in Accra have observed that a bag of rice that sold for around GHS 300–350 in 2022–2023 rose to GHS 450–500 or more by 2024–2025 (depending on brand and market location). This is not inconsistent with falling inflation. Instead, it reflects how inflation works over time.  First, prices increased sharply during the high-inflation period.  Then, even after inflation slowed, prices continued rising, just at a reduced pace.  But still, the earlier increases remain “locked in.” So when someone says, “inflation is falling,” and a trader responds, “but rice is still expensive,” both statements can be true. Transport fares and daily costs. Transport provides another clear example. Between 2022 and 2023, Ghana experienced multiple fuel price adjustments linked to global oil prices and the depreciation of the cedi.  These increases led to repeated upward adjustments in public transport fares. Even when inflation began to decline in 2024, transport fares largely remained elevated.  This is because fuel prices did not fall significantly enough to justify fare reductions.  And operators adjusted fares upward to cover past cost increases.  So costs such as spare parts that are often imported remained high. For commuters, the lived reality is simple: we are still paying more than before. The Power of “Accumulated Inflation”. One of the most important concepts for understanding Ghana’s situation is cumulative inflation.  Inflation compounds over time. A period of high inflation permanently raises the general price level. Back-to-back increases dramatically raise the cost of living. Even if inflation falls, it does not undo those earlier increases. Prices continue from a much higher starting point. This is why many households feel that “things are worse,” even when macroeconomic indicators show improvement. Why food prices hit harder. Another reason for the disconnect is that inflation is an average, but people experience specific prices. In Ghana, food carries the largest weight in the inflation basket; it’s about 43% of the CPI.   This means that if food prices rise sharply, households feel it immediately. Even if other prices stabilise, food inflation dominates daily experience. Food prices are influenced by, exchange rate movements (many inputs are imported), transport costs, weather and agricultural output, and storage and distribution inefficiencies. As a result, food inflation often feels higher than the headline inflation rate. The Exchange Rate Effect. A key driver of Ghana’s inflation in recent years has been the depreciation or appreciation of the Ghana Cedi. When the cedi weakens, imported goods become more expensive, fuel costs rise, and production costs increase. Businesses respond by raising prices.  Even when the cedi stabilises, as it has more recently, prices do not automatically fall. Businesses rarely reverse price increases unless costs decline significantly and consistently. This explains why stabilisation does not immediately translate into relief at the market level. Why lower inflation still matters. If prices are still rising, why do economists emphasise falling inflation as a positive development? Well, because stability matters! High inflation creates uncertainty. Businesses struggle to plan. Investors hesitate. Households cannot predict future costs. A declining inflation rate signals that price increases are coming under control, even as they’re still increasing. This creates a more predictable environment for economic activity. In Ghana, the recent decline in inflation has been supported by tight monetary policy by the Bank of Ghana, fiscal adjustments under IMF-supported programmes, and the relative stabilisation of the exchange rate. These measures are beginning to slow the pace of price increases, even if they have not yet reduced prices. Why People Feel Left Behind. Despite these improvements, many Ghanaians do not feel relief. This is not a misunderstanding because it reflects real economic pressures. Three key factors explain this. 1. Prices Rose Faster Than Incomes: Wages have not kept pace with inflation. Many workers, especially in the informal sector, do not receive automatic wage adjustments. Even in the formal sector, salary increases often lag behind inflation. This means purchasing power has declined. 2. Essential Goods Are Still Expensive: Households spend most of their income on food, transport and rent. If these remain expensive, overall well-being does not improve, regardless of what inflation data shows. 3. Expectations vs Reality: People naturally interpret “lower inflation” as “things are getting cheaper.” When this expectation is not met, it leads to frustration and distrust. This is not a failure of the public sector. It is just a communication gap. Communicating Inflation Better. The challenge then is more than